University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Propositions

California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives

1988

Commission On Judicial Performance.

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props
Recommended Citation
Commission On Judicial Performance. California Proposition 92 (1988).
http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/973

This Proposition is brought to you for free and open access by the California Ballot Propositions and Initiatives at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Propositions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

92

Commission on Judicial Performance
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMAr\CE. LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Specifies
the powers which the Commission on Judicial Performance may exercise if, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, it determines that formal disciplinary proceedings should be instituted against a judge. Such powers
would permit public hearings on charges of moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, and require public hearing at
request of judge charged absent good cause for confidentiality. Shortens the term of specified members of the
Commission from 4 to 2 years in order to provide for staggered tenns. Prohibits members from serving more than two
4-year terms. Summary of Legislative Analyst's estimate of net state and local government fiscal impact: This measure
would have a minor impact on state costs.
Final Vote Cast by the Legislature on SCA 6 (Proposition 92)
Assembly: Ayes 72
:\oes 0

Senate: Ayes 36
Noes 0

Analysis by the Legislative Analyst
Background
Under the California Constitution, the Commission on
Judicial Performance investigates complaints regarding
the conduct of judges.
The Commission on Judicial Performance consists of
nine members. These members include five judges, who
are appointed by the Supreme Court; two members of
the State Bar of California, who are appointed by the
State Bar's Board of Governors; and two representatives
of the public, who are appointed by the Governor and
approved by the Senate. The members serve four-year
tenns. There is no express requirement that the terms be
staggered. Moreover, there are no provisions specifying
whether members may be reappointed. The commission's recommendations for discipline of judges are subject to review and approval by the California Supreme
Court.
The commission receives, on average, about 400 complaints against judges each year and determines that
about five cases warrant hearings. The complaints are
handled on a confidential basis, but become public when
they are filed with the Supreme Court. For less serious
cases of misconduct, the commission may privately reprimand a judge. The Supreme Court may, but is not
required to, review these actions. For cases involving

serious misconduct, the commission may recommend to
the Supreme Court that judges be suspended, censured,
retired, or removed.
Proposal
This constitutional amendment shortens the terms of
specified members of the Commission on Judicial Performance to two years in order to provide for sta~
ed
tenns. The measure also prohibits members from se. ~
more than two four-year tenns, but authorizes a mem~r
whose term has expired to continue serving until a
successor is appointed. In addition, this measure specifies
that if the commission determines that formal proceedings should be instituted, the judge or judges charged
may require the hearings to be public, unless the commission finds good cause for making them confidential.
The measure also allows the commission, without further
review by the Supreme Court, to issue a public reprimand, with the consent of the judge, for conduct warranting discipline. It further allows the commission to
issue press statements or releases, and explanatory statements, as specified, or, in some instances, to open hearings to the public.
Fiscal Effect
This measure would have a minor impact on state costs.
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T ext of Proposed Law
This amendment proposed by Senate Constitutional
A.mendment 6 (Statutes of 1988, Resolution Chapter 67)
pv ..... T'essiy amends tne Constitution by amending sections
eof: therefore. existing provisions proposed to be
deleted are printeci in !3tf'iiEesHt ~ and new provisions
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate
that they are new.

is reversed suspension terminates, and the judge shall be
paid the salary for the judicial office held by the judge for
the period of suspension. If the judge is suspended and
the conviction becomes final the Supreme Court shall
remove the judge from office.
(C) On recommendation of the Com.mission on Judicial Performance the Supreme Court may (1) retire a
judge for disability that seriously interferes with the
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE n,
performance of the judge's duties and is or is likely to
SECTIONS 8 AND 18
become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge
First-That SectIon 8 of Article VI thereof is amended for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the
commencement of the judge's current term that constito read:
SEC. 8. (a) The Com.mission on Judicial Perfor- tutes wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure or
mance consists of 2 judges of courts of appeal, 2 judges of inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct
superior courts, and one judge of a municipal court, each prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the
appointed by the Supreme Court; 2 members of the State judicial office into disrepute. The esfftfftissisft CommisBar of California wno have practiced law in this State for sion on Judicial Performance may privately admonish a
10 years, appointed by its governing body; and 2 citizens judge found to have engaged in an improper action or ft
who are not judges, retired judges, or members of the dereliction of duty, subject to review in the Supreme
State Bar of Cal~fornia, appointed by the Governor and Court in the manner provided for review of causes
approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership decided by a court of appeal.
concurring. AH Except as provided in subdivision (b), all
(d) A judge retired by the Supreme Court shall be
terms are 4 years . .vo member shall serve more than 2 considered to have retired voluntarily. A judge removed
4-year terms.
by the Supreme Court is ineligible for judicial office and
Coffimission membership terminates if a member pending further order of the court is suspended from
ceases to hold the position that qualified the member for practicing law in this State.
appointment. A vacancy shall be filled by the appointing
(e) A recommendation of the Commission on Judicial
power for the remainder of the term. A member whose Performance for the censure, removal or retirement of a
term has expired may continue to serve until the vacancy judge of the Supreme Court shall be determined by a
hI" l,een filled by the appointing power.
tribunal of 7 court of appeal judges selected by lot.
) ) To create staggered terms among the members of
{f) If, after conducting a preliminary investigation,
the Commission on Judicial Performance. the following the Commission on Judicial Performance by vote determembers shall be appointed, as follows:
mines that formal proceedings should be instituted:
(1) The court of appeal member appointed to immedi( 1) The judge or judges charged may require that
ately succeed the term that expires on November 8. 1988. formal hearings be public, unless the Commission on
Judicial Performance by vote finds good cause for confishall serve a 2-year term.
(2) Of the State Bar members appointed to immedi- dential hearings.
(2) The Commission on Judicial Performance may,
ately succeed terms that expire on December 31, 1988, one
without further review in the Supreme Court, issue a
.member shall sen'e for a 2-year term.
Second-That Se'ction 18 of Article VI thereof is public reproval with the consent of the judge for oonduct
warranting discipline. The public reproval shall include
amended to read:
SEC. 18. (a) A judge is disqualified from acting as a an enumeration of any and all formal charges brought
judge, without loss of salary, while there is pending (1) an against the judge which have not been dismissed by the
indictment or an information charging the judge in the commission.
United States with a crime punishable as a felony under
(3) The Commission on Judicial Performance may in
California or federal law, or (2) a recommendation to the the pursuit of public confidence and the interests of
Supreme Court bv the Com.mission on Judicial Perfor- justice, issue press statements or releases or, in the event
mance for removal or retirement of the judge,
•
charges involve moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corrup.
(b) On recommendation of the Commission on Judi- tion, open hearings to the public.
cial Performance or on its own motion, the Supreme
(g) The Commission on Judicial Performance may
Court may suspend a judge from office without salary issue explanatory statements at any investigatory stage
when in the United States the judge pleads guilty or no when the subject matter is generally known to the public.
contest or is found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony
(h) The Judicial Council shall make rules implementunder California or federal law or of any other crime that ing this section and providing for confidentiality of
involves moral turpitude under that law. If the conviction proceedings. .
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Commission on Judicial Performance
Argument in Favor of Proposition 92

For our system of justice to work. it is absolutely
necessarv that we have complete faith in our judges.
For the most part, California has been blessed with a
judiciary of integrity. While some citizens will always
object to the policies of particular judges, few would
question their honesty and basic decency. When judicial
abuses do occur, however, they must be addressed
promptly, decisively and with sufficient openness to
assure continued public confidence.
Our State Constitution provides for a Commission on
Judicial Performance which investigates charges against
judges and makes recommendations to the Supreme
Court, including censure or removal from the bench
when appropriate.
The Supreme Court has the final word, but the commission does the real work. Trouble is, the nine-member
commission, including five judges and two attorneys, does
its work in complete secrecy. The press and the public are
barred from proceedings and any knowledge of the
charges or facts in the case.
Between 1960 and 1987, only 25 of the 7,185 complaints
lodged with the commission resulted in public punishment. Even if a judge has already been publicly tried and
convicted of a misdemeanor, the disciplinary proceedings
of the commission based on the same misconduct are
closed to the public.
Judges should not be subject to public suspicion based
on a mere complaint but once formal charges are filed,
perhaps the public should know. That is what happens in
24 other states. That is how cases are handled involving
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals.
Proposition 92 proposes to open disciplinary proceedings against judges in a limited but reasonable way. It

does not require public proceedings following formal
charges as in other states. It simply allows an accused
judge or the commission to open proceedings subsequent
to formal charges fu appropriate cases. Due to the high
quality of our judiciary, this change poses no threat ~of
endless public spectacle. After all, in 1987 only five judges
in California faced any formal charges at all.
Proposition 92 also includes provisions which allow the
accused judge and the commission to agree to a public
reprimand as well as provisions which stagger the terms
of commission members.
This proposition was drafted in part by the Commission
on Judicial Performance itself, with the help of the
Judicial Council and the California Judges Association. All
agree that the primary job of the commission is to protect
the public from judicial misconduct. All believe this
amendment represents a sensible accommodation of the
public interest.
We're proud of our judges and the fine work they do.
But every public official, no matter how high the office,
must ultimately be accountable to the public. When the
integrity of our courts comes under question, we can ill
afford to be bound by a rule which concludes in every
case that the public and press are better off in the dark.
Such absolute secrecy is the antithesis of democracy.
Provide a little sunlight in this critical area of govt..~
ment. Vote yes on Proposition 92.
t.
'-:1
ED DAVIS
SIDle 5entJtor, 19th DUtrict
BILL LOCKYER
SIDle 5entJtor, 10th District
TOM McCLINTOCK
Member of the Assembly, 36th DUtrict

Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 92
I agree with the proponents that we need complete
faith in our judges and therein lies our difference. The
proponents do not go far enough in their proposal in
changing the commission on judicial performance. If
you're going to amend the Constitution then do it right
the first time.
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Too many ignorant and incompetent lawyers are appointed as judges who too often become arrogant in their
security of immunity. The record of the commission on
judicial performance, given by the proponents, i.e., only
25 out of 7,185 complaints resulted in public punishment
in 27 years speaks for itself-wimpy-merely a wristslapping public entity that is neither useful nor cost

effective in its present state. Their poor record is understandable-presently there are 5 judges, 2 lawyers, and 2
laypeople on the commission who recommend to the
Supreme Court (more lawyer-justices) to censure or
remove a brother.
Change it to 5laypeople (women and minorities should
be represented), 2 judges, and 2 lawyers and give them
some teeth by letting them have the sole power to
censure or remove rogue judges. Only then would the
public's confidence be restored in their judicial system.
VOTE NO on Prop 92. The legislators need to place
another measure on the ballot with the above recommendations.
STEVE D. WILSON, Ph.D.
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Argument Against Proposition 92
The Commission on Judicial Performance consists of 5
judges, 2 lawyers and 2 nonlawyers serving terms of 4
years. The function of the commission is to investigate
alleged judicial misconduct and take appropriate action.
The Commission on Judicial Performance may clear a
judge of any wrongdoing or admonish a judge if misconduct is found. The commission may also recommend that
the California Supreme Court censure or remove a judge
from office.
When one considers how judges gain office, it becomes
quite evident why California needs an active, independent Commission on Judicial Performance.
Judges of the trial courts in California's 58 counties
(called justice courts, municipal courts and superior
courts) are supposed to be elected; however, the State
Constitution provides that vacancies may be filled by
appointment of the Governor. When a new judgeship is
created or when a local judge retires, a vacancy exists and
the Governor makes an appointment. Once appointed,
the new judge will never be on the ballot unless a local
lawyer has the unmitigated gall to run against the appointee and give local voters a choice in the matter.
J •. ';es of the higher, appellate courts (the court of
ap:. • and the California Supreme Court) are appointed
. the Governor, confirmed by a Commission on Judicial
,.J'pointments and serve the unexpired portion of the
12-year terms held by their predecessors. At the next
gubernatorial election, appellate court judges (actually
called "justices") appear on the ballot for approval or
rejection by voters. If appellate court justices are rejected

by voters. the Governor has the opportunity to appoint
replacements.
A lot of money is at stake in California's court system.
\1ultimillion-dollar lawsuits are pending. The potential
for corruption certainly is present.
Perhaps more important, however, is the need to
control the arrogance of too many judges. We need a
mechanism for instilling and ensuring humility and respect for the law in those lawyers who manage to gain
appointment to judicial office.
Given that local attorneys are afraid to run against
appointed trial court judges and that voters seldom
receive much information when it comes time to approve
or reject appellate court justices, the Commission on
Judicial Performance is left to hold judges accountable
and ensure that ours is a system of laws and not men.
That brings us to Proposition 92. This measure would
stagger the terms of the 9 members of the commission
and establish a two-term limit.
,
A two-term limit is desirable for many government
positions, although, in this case, a one-term limit would be
better.
Staggering terms is j\:OT desirable because periodically
replacing the entire commission could allow new members to replace the entire staff and completely revise the
operation, if necessary .
Voters should reject Proposition 92 and the Legislature
should place on the ballot another measure that would
establish a one-term limit and provide for more than 2
nonattorneys on the commission.
STEVE D. WILSON, Ph.D.

Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 92
Since its creation in 1960, the Commission on Judicial
Performance has responded to complaints involving the
conduct of judges. While the judges of California are not
perfect, they have forged a tradition of excellence of
which we can be proud. Proposition 92 seeks to ensure
California's position as a national leader in the law.
Occasional breaches of judicial conduct are inevitable
but no major or systematic problem exists in California.
Accordingiy, Proposition 92 has been drafted with the
objective of assuring continued public confidence in a
fine system through increased openness.
Mter 28 years it is appropriate that some adjustments
be made to the operation of the Commission on Judicial
Performance.
The argument against Proposition 92 indicates that the
oppr-~nt shares some of the same objectives as those who
sUI-.
~ Proposition 92. While it is difficult to determine
most appropriate degree of scrutiny, it is clear that

J
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both opponent and proponents desire greater public
accountability. The differences in perspective appear
minor.
Proposition 92, which is the product of numerous open
hearings in the Legislature, was drafted with the expert
assistance of the Commission on Judicial Performance
and is designed for the sole purpose of making the
Commission more responsive to the needs of the public.
Proposition 92 is not intended to allay the concerns of
every disgruntled litigant, or resolve every potential
problem with the judiciary, but is a sound move in the
right direction.
Vote yes on Proposition 92.

f

'-

l'

ED DAVIS
State Senator, 19th District
BILL LOCKYER
State Senator, 10th District
TOM McCUNTOCK
Member of the Assembly, 36th District
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